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This thesis is a requirement for completion of the Honors
Program at Columbus State University . It is to be
completed in the final year of the student ' s undergraduate
course work at the institution . Its contents must address
a controversial topic related to the graduate' s chosen
field of study or major. Each student must present his or
her argument to a hearing board, which consists of three
professors from the related department and the chair of the
Honors Program . In order to achieve successful completion
of the thesis, the committee must deem that the student '
s
research and arguments are reasonable and that the student
has provided adequate support for his or her argument
within the body of the thesis. This thesis addresses an
accounting issue that has just recently surfaced as a
dominant theme in the accounting profession , independence
and the applicable Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The body of this thesis begins with an explanation of
fraud and several ways that it can occur in financial
reporting. Although fraud has been an issue for as long as
businesses have existed, it was a series of recent events
that led to an increasing controversy within the accounting
profession. Before the year 2000, the revelation of a
major fraud scheme would only emerge about as often as a
national census; however, the turn of the century yielded a
more frequent discovery of corrupt business practices than
ever before. From the year 1999 to the adoption of
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, there were hundreds of major fraud
cases in the United States (Vernich 7) . Many business
experts attribute the higher frequency of misstatements to
the dwindling economy. They believe that business
owners/managers are trying to cover up the fact that their
companies may be either financially unstable or at a profit
maximization standstill, so they will overstate their
earnings or assets (Vernich 8) . This theory may hold true
for many of the guilty parties, but on occasion, companies
have also understated their financial statements for one
reason or another. Several possible reasons for both
overstatement and understatement and cases of each
treatment are discussed in sections II and III of the
thesis
.
Following the introduction to fraud and
misrepresentation of financial statements, the focus shifts
toward auditor independence and how the lack thereof can
prove to be an underlying contributor to dishonesty within
a corporation. First, this section explains what exactly
is auditor independence, what it requires, and what types
of actions or relationships can affect it. Then, it
explains why the lack of independence is the main reason
that material misstatements can seem to slip through the
cracks unnoticed. These auditors often play an extensive
role in both the fraud as well as the degree to which the
business covers up its deceitful business practices.
Several of the cases mentioned in the misstatement sections
of the thesis provide examples in which the auditors were
not only aware of the fraud, but were also key players in
the unsuccessful attempts to cover it up. These cases
along with other important information in this section will
provide a detailed explanation as to why independence has
become such a controversial matter among all business
professions and how it led to the adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley in 2002.
The fifth section of the thesis focuses on the
contents of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The main
purpose of this part of the thesis is not only to introduce
the details of the Act, but also to establish why it was
created and what purpose it is supposed to serve to the
accounting profession as well as audited corporations. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law by President George
W. Bush on July 30, 2002, and it took effect immediately.
It was established as a reaction to the increasing
fraudulent financial reporting, which eventually led to the
bankruptcies of several large U.S. corporations and the
demise of one of the world's leading accounting firms. In
all, the Act has eleven titles with sixty-nine total
sections, and it is sixty-six pages in length. Since the
first proposal was made on June 14, 2002, over seventy-five
proposals passed through Congress virtually unopposed. The
need for change was so urgent that the entire Act took less
than two months to complete, pass in Congress, and be
signed into law. Its main purpose is to establish more
strict standards for both auditors and their clients in
hopes to decrease fraudulent financial reporting in the
future { www. nlcpi . org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03 (Bost) .pdf ) .
Section VI of the thesis expands on details of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and establishes a basis for the argument
that some of the standards and responsibilities set forth
in the Act need to be removed or changed for one reason or
another. In addition, some issues have been overlooked in
the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley, and section VI also
addresses these concerns. Of the eleven titles in the Act,
eight contain information relevant to the incorporation of
new rules and regulations for either businesses or auditing
firms. Section six discusses several of these titles and
acknowledges several arguments that can be made to refute
some of these new restrictions. After each argument has
been presented to dispute a particular section of the Act,
then the issues that have been either overlooked or
disregarded in the generation of Sarbanes-Oxley are
addressed. Furthermore, this section expands on these
issues by providing evidence to support their relevance to
the auditing profession. The primary purpose for section
VI of the thesis is to dissect the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, expose the controversial topics that it entails, and
provide a basis for the proposed amendments in section VII.
The seventh section of the thesis deals with the
suggested solutions to the problems mentioned in section
VI. Originally, section VI and VII were supposed to be
combined into one section; however, after finding so many
problems with Sarbanes-Oxley, one section was devoted
entirely to pointing out the problems and another was
devoted to solving them. In section VII, there is not only
a discussion of the revised Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but also an
explanation as to why these changes are important.
Although making a revision to something like that seems
like it would be a rather straightforward and simple
process, it is actually a very complicated and lengthy
procedure. For this reason, we rarely ever see changes
made to laws or bills that have already passed through
Congress. Section VII provides the framework for the final
section, which includes both the overall assessment of the
findings and a personal synopsis of the thesis as a whole.
As mentioned previously, section VIII is the overall
conclusion/summary of the experiences involved with writing
this thesis. This section discusses not only the amount of
research required and what is found in such research, but
also why writing this thesis can prove to be helpful in
someone's chosen field of study. Writing a thesis proved
to be a difficult task, which requires countless hours of
research and preparation. Because of the numerous weeks
put into the creation of such a project, it certainly
prepares the author for similar projects in the future.
In all, reading this should be both entertaining and
educational. The arguments should prove to the reader that
mistakes are made at every level of the business world, and
that politics are no exception. The adoption of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was founded on good intentions,
but before the government can eliminate many of the
fraudulent business practices that occur in our society




It has never been unusual to hear of a company that
overstates certain figures in their financial statements so
that the business appears more profitable; however,
understating profits and earnings has recently become a
popular practice in the business world. A common question
for those involved in this type of fraudulent reporting
might be, "Why would you want your company to appear that
it is in worse financial shape than it is?" To most
outsiders, understating profitability might seem like a
disaster waiting to happen, but financial managers and
CEO's will often employ this technique for several reasons.
The most common reason for understating financial
statements is a process known as "smoothing earnings."
This is a rather simple procedure in which a company will
understate earnings in a more profitable year so that it
can overstate them in a later, less profitable year. For
years, financial experts have predicted quarterly and
annual earnings for traded corporations. The companies
that always seem to barely exceed expectations are the ones
that typically experience a consistent increase in their
stock price. A consistently increasing stock price usually
means both a better reputation and higher compensation for
managers (Vernich 16) . Therefore, the process of smoothing
earnings provides added incentives for managers because it
can change the overall outlook for the future of the
company. Although this type of fraudulent activity occurs
at every level of the business world, it happens more often
in industries where each transaction can have a significant
impact on yearly earnings (Vernich 19) . For example,
assume that a small contracting company with an average
annual profit of $1,000,000 lands a deal that will increase
their profits by $300,000 in the current year. However,
the job will last well into the next fiscal year, and the
shorter year will result in a significantly lower profit
than the $1,000,000 average. Often times, in this
situation, the company is required to record all $300,000
of the profits in the current year; however, some companies
will attempt to smooth the earnings by reporting $100,000
of the profits in the current year and the other $200,000
in the subsequent year. This way, it will appear that the
company is experiencing a trend of constant economic
growth. By doing this, the company will become more
attractive to both investors and potential clients.
A second reason for understating profit figures is to
increase or decrease the value of the company in the case
of a potential buy-out or contract renewal. If a business
owner knows that he or she wants to sell a particular
business in five years from the current year, it is not
uncommon to understate profits for the first two years and
then show a steady increase by overstating profits in the
three year period preceding the buy-out (Vernich 18) . By
doing this, they can get a higher selling price for the
business when they choose to sell it. On the other hand,
it is also possible for a company to attempt to decrease
the value of the business by understating P & E. Such was
the case with Six Flags, Inc. in 1998. Time-Warner
Corporation, the principal owner of Six Flags, was accused
of understating profits and under-investing in the theme
park chain so that it could renew its contract with Six
10
Flags at a discount. The managers and investors of Six
Flags sued and defeated Time-Warner in a multi-million
dollar lawsuit in which the jury found Time-Warner
Corporation guilty of several intentionally deceitful
business practices. The final verdict was a $474 million
fine to Time-Warner Corporation, which was upheld despite
several attempts by Time-Warner to appeal the decision
(Vernich 18) . In spite of the hefty fine imposed by the
courts, companies still continue to practice the art of
financial understatement so as to change the value of the
business for buy-out and contract renewal purposes.
The final reason that a company would understate its
profit figures involves decreasing the value of its stock
for the purposes of buying back its outstanding shares. A
company will buy back its outstanding shares of common
stock for several reasons. First, a stock buyback portrays
a company' s confidence in its future performance as well as
the future of the economy as a whole. For this reason, a
stock buyback will often provide a false assurance to
shareholders and will increase the long-run value of the
company's stock. Another reason that companies want to
decrease the stock value and buy back outstanding shares is
to soak up stock options. If the value of common shares
decreases, the company can buy more shares with its actual
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profits and distribute these shares as employee stock
options. The third reason that a company approves a
buyback is to distract investors from dividends. If a
company promises a buyback and investors feel that this
buyback will increase the value of their stock, then they
will be less likely to pressure the company to increase the
amount of dividends paid per share. Companies prefer the
buyback option to an increase in dividends because they are
not required to follow through with the buyback. The final
reason that a company would want to buyback its shares is
to inflate profitability. Because earnings per share (EPS)
is calculated only on outstanding shares, fewer outstanding
shares will increase EPS. A higher EPS can make business
look better, which in turn can be attractive to future
investors and potential customers alike (Vernich 21) . It
is easy to see how the buyback option can be attractive to
companies, and understating earnings has allowed companies
to buy its outstanding shares at a cheaper price. In turn,
understating P & E to decrease the price of a company'
s
shares also makes the buyback process illegal.
On the surface, it may seem unlikely for a company to
understate its earnings figures, but a closer look reveals
several reasons that a business owner or manager would want
to disguise profitability. Because hiding profits can be
12
difficult and illegal, managers will often choose a
different method of understating financial stability. One
way to legally conceal profitability is to inflate
depreciation. For example, instead of using the straight-
line method, a company can increase depreciation figures by
using the double declining balance method. Another way to
understate P & E is to inflate tax figures. Although a
company can choose one of several ways to do this, the most
common method is to not record certain tax deductions to
which it is entitled. By doing this, a business will owe
more taxes, and the earnings figures will decrease. The
final way to understate profits without disturbing revenues
is to include future costs in current accounts. If a
manager knows that the company will make purchases in the
near future, they will often record these purchases before
the transaction ever takes place. By doing this, current
costs are increased while current P & E are simultaneously
decreased (Vernich 24) . These are just a few of several
methods that managers use to understate the financial





The more common of the two types of financial
misstatement is earnings overstatement. This is the
process by which a company owner or manager inflates
profits to make the company appear more attractive to its
current clients and potential investors or creditors.
Often times, the financial stability of a company reflects
the guality of management; therefore, managers feel added
pressure to boost earnings so that they either meet or beat
expectations (Vernich 27). In addition, financial
stability for the company usually means a larger paycheck
for the managers. So managers will sometimes inflate the
company' s figures to achieve a personal gain and avoid the
risk of losing his or her job. Other than the obvious
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reasons of personal job security and additional
compensation, several other aspects of a company provide
incentive for managers to overstate earnings. These
include greed, fear, regulatory environment, industry
conditions, and the economic environment. In order to run
any successful corporation, the employees, the clients, the
shareholders, and the creditors must all be content with
what is going on within the company. If a manager suspects
that one of these groups of people is unsatisfied, then he
or she will often take desperate measures to alleviate the
problem (Vernich 27) . The most common reasons for a
company to overstate income are to sell the company or
publicly offer the company, to satisfy debt covenants, and
to increase personal wealth for the upper-level employees.
On most occasions, the board of directors and managers
will know far in advance if the owners are planning to sell
the company or offer its shares to the public. In fact,
this information is usually released to the upper-level
managers at least two years in advance with the
recommendation that the company perform well before the
buy-out or IPO. With these instructions in mind, managers
will often influence the numbers so that the company'
s
market value will increase or its stock will sell for a
higher price (Vernich 29) . In return, in the case of a
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buyout, the owners will often give a good review of these
particular managers to the new owners so that these
managers can maintain their current positions in the
company. Such was the case with Qwest Corporation in 2001.
Although the details of this case are still somewhat
unclear, shareholders have made several allegations against
four upper-level company executives. According to the
accusations, these executives not only boosted earnings to
meet quarterly expectations, but they had also had previous
discussions about potentially offering the company for sale
if the profits showed a consistent increase in the near
future. Thus, they and other managers bolstered earnings
in order to increase the attractiveness of the company
(Vernich 29) . Because these executives decided to
manipulate the books, they are now facing the possibility
of many years in prison and millions of dollars in fines.
In some cases, a company will overstate earnings in
order to satisfy debt covenants. On occasion, a company
will borrow funds for one reason or another without ample
funding to repay the debt in the required amount of time.
Financial institutions will often recognize a low income to
debt ratio and will either not loan the money or will loan
the money under several strict conditions. A business will
often employ sketchy tactics to either cover up its
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inability to pay creditors or to pay creditors with false
earnings. This lack of funds became a problem for
Parmalat, Inc. at the turn of the century. From the years
2000 to 2003, Parmalat executives had overstated its
earnings by as much as $12 billion. One way that they
accomplished this elaborate scheme to fool its creditors
was by creating false accounts with several multi-million
dollar clients and creating false documents to accompany
these non-existent income sources (Vernich 31) . By doing
this, they were proving to creditors that they could meet
their current debt obligations, thus persuading new
creditors to loan them money. In late 2003, they convinced
one bank to loan them a large sum of money in order to
purchase another company. The first payment on the debt
came due about the time that the fraud scheme was unveiled.
It was not until then that the financial institution
realized that it had made a huge mistake. Although
Parmalat continues its operations, its stock price has
fallen to almost nothing, and over twenty of its upper-
level executives have been arrested for their involvement
in the conspiracy.
The most common reason for overstating profits and
earnings in a corporation is for the upper-level employees
to increase their own personal wealth. Most of the time,
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when this situation arises, it happens at companies with a
long history of increased earnings. These companies are
not trying to get out of debt and therefore lying about
earnings. Instead, it is greed among the upper-level
executives that causes the fraud to eventually surface. Of
the hundreds of fraud cases each year in the United States,
over sixty percent of them are a result of the wealthy
trying to become wealthier. Such was the case with several
recent fraud schemes in the U.S. Within the last four
years, Adelphia, Tyco, HealthSouth and Enron Corp. have all
experienced a downfall due to greed at the management/owner
levels. Adelphia founder John J. Rigas, his three sons,
and two other company executives have been charged with
overstating earnings to greatly exceed Wall Street
expectations. With the extra income that was recorded by
the corporation, members of the Rigas family were making
stock purchases and buying luxurious condominiums in New
York and elsewhere. Corporate funds were also being used
to make expensive purchases for the other two executives,
who were leaders in the plan to falsify earnings. Overall,
these founders and executives spent over $250 million
dollars in company funds for personal benefit. At Tyco,
the story was pretty much the same. Upper-level executives
Dennis Kozlowski, Mark Swartz, and Mark Belnick were
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accused of selling enormous amounts of company stock
without notifying the public and taking out "personal
loans" from the company to make purchases that added to
their already lavish lifestyles. Although the three men
maintain that all borrowed funds were approved by the Board
of Directors, some members of the Board have no
recollection of any agreement to loan these funds to the
men or to have them repay the funds at such a low interest
rate. The three executives are charged with corruption,
conspiracy, grand larceny, falsifying records, falsifying
business reports, and failing to report personal loans to
the compensation committee. Unlike Adelphia, this
manufacturing giant has hired new management and seems to
have overcome the difficult situation. In the case of
HealthSouth, the company was overstating its earnings to
either meet or beat the profit expectations set forth by
Wall Street forecasters. One way that they were
accomplishing this fraud was by recording profits for
multiple clients or group clients at individual client
rates. As imagined, the patients who receive group care
have to pay a discounted rate as compared to those
receiving one on one care. With the extra earnings that
were raked in by HealthSouth, the CFO Richard Scrushy was
making personal expenditures in excess of $300 million per
19
year. In addition, when Scrushy believed that the
outpatient giant would experience losses due to regulatory
changes, he sold over ninety-four percent of his stock in
the company. His attempts to increase personal gain and
avoid personal loss eventually raised a red flag, and the
company went under investigation in September of 2002.
Meanwhile, another multi-billion dollar giant was also
undergoing investigations for its creative bookkeeping.
One of the largest corporate scandals in the history of the
United States was emerging in Houston, Texas at the expense
of thousands and thousands of shareholders. Enron
Corporation was a large energy manufacturer that had
experienced financial growth for decades without ever
falling under the public eye of scrutiny. However, in late
2001, Enron restated its previous years' earnings by over
$591 million. This restatement raised a red flag about how
a company could have recognized that much income, when in
reality, it was non-existent. The stock price fell by over
ninety percent, and the accusations began to fly. Before
it was all said and done, over 20 Enron executives, several
financial institutions, a few law firms, and two major
accounting firms were charged with some sort of involvement
in the debacle. Although the Enron executives were
persistent that the restatements were a result of a series
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of mistakes, further investigation revealed that this was
not the case. Not only were these upper-level executives
involved in a scheme to hide some of Enron' s debt and
overstate its profits, they were also slapped with charges
of insider trading and using company funds for personal
benefit. Almost all of the executives charged in the case
had been making purchases such as vacations, houses, cars,
etc. with Enron-generated funds. In total, these company
executives embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars in
company funds and cost many shareholders their life
savings, which had been tied up in Enron stock for decades
(Vernich 31-35) . As one can see, greed among the upper-
level executives is quite possibly the most damaging form
of fraud that a corporation can go through. In all of the
cases mentioned above, the company experienced tremendous
blows to its profits, its stock price, and its reputation.
In all but one of the cases, the covetous actions of only a
few people eventually led to the downfall of the multi-






The concept of independence has just recently surfaced
as a major issue in public accounting. In fact, during the
initial discussions for the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley
,
independence was an important topic that led to the
creation of several sections of the Act. The reason that
independence has become such an important issue in the
profession is because many experts believe that the lack
thereof is the underlying cause of the fraudulent activity.
Before one can understand why this has become a common
belief among many accounting experts, he or she must
understand what is independence and how it can be affected.
Independence is a concept that requires an external
auditor to maintain a certain level of professional
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skepticism when performing an audit. What this means is
that the auditor must try to have a neutral attitude when
auditing one of his or her firm's clients. He or she must
not be influenced by anything other than the figures that
can be supported because any financial information that the
auditor finds could be a red flag and could possibly lead
to the detection of fraud (Canton 12) . If a company knows
that it is involved in fraudulent activity, its upper-level
executives may try to say things or do things that lead the
auditor away from the fraudulent accounts. The easiest way
to influence an auditor is to affect his or her
independence. The most common ways that an auditor or
audit firm can lose independence is by performing other
services or working for a client, establishing close
relationships with clients, or relying too heavily on the
audit fees
.
One way that independence is affected is when an
auditor either works for or performs other services for a
client. In many cases, a CPA will work on the audit staff
that reviews a client's financial records and will also
serve as a financial consultant for the client. The
problem with this is that the CPA wants to see that the
financial advice given to the client is working well. If
it is, then the client will continue to use that particular
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CPA for consulting services. This affects the independence
of the CPA because he is more likely to overlook a material
misstatement if its results benefit the company to whom he
provides consulting. If the misstatement provides a
brighter outlook for the company, then the executives will
want to continue to use the CPA for the other services he
has provided.
Another common way that an auditor loses independence
is by establishing close relationships with clients. This
situation has become a double-edged sword for most auditors
because they want to continually improve client relations,
but at the same time, they must maintain a level of
professional skepticism. In many cases, an audit firm will
keep a client for so long that they become friends with the
upper-level managers and executives within the company.
When this happens, it becomes very difficult for an auditor
to detect fraudulent activity. The first reason is because
the auditors begin to trust the managers and the executives
to the point where they will not perform the tests
necessary to formulate an opinion. Instead, they will
simply ask the executives if the financial information is
correct, and assuming a confirmation, they will issue an
opinion without ever really examining the true financial
condition of the company. The second reason that
24
establishing relationships makes it difficult to detect
fraud is because no one wants to turn in someone that they
consider to be a friend. If an auditor and an executive
spend many days on the golf course together and many nights
eating dinner with their families, then it is very unlikely
that the auditor will report fraudulent activity to the
SEC. Historically, auditors have been more reluctant to
report fraudulent activity committed by their long-term
clients than they have the fraud committed by their newer
clients (Canton 13) . The reason is because over a long
period of time, the auditors and the upper-level executives
in the company establish relationships that affect
independence
.
The most common of all independence factors is heavy
reliance on fees and compensation. Most of the larger
audit firms in the United States receive millions of
dollars from their largest clients for audit fees and other
service fees. Each auditor knows that detecting fraud will
more than likely lead to the demise of the corporation and
the eventual loss of an important client. With this in
mind, they are more likely to either overlook a material
misstatement, or in some cases, assist in the efforts to
cover it up. An auditor knows that the detection of fraud
could have several consequences on both the client and the
25
auditing firm. For the client, this means several
lawsuits, a huge drop in the stock price, and probably
bankruptcy. For the audit firm, this means, at the very
least, the loss of millions of dollars in revenues per
year. If an investigation ensues and more fraud is
uncovered from previous years, it could mean a stream of
accusations that the auditing firm knew about the
fraudulent activity all along. If this happens, then the
audit firm will take a hit to its reputation as well as its
bank account, and the upper-level audit managers could
spend some time in jail. If this situation occurs, then it
is almost certain that the auditing firm will go down with
the client. For these reasons, the auditors will more than
likely choose to overlook the fraud, take the millions in
revenue, and do whatever they can to keep the situation
under the table. Most audit firms will choose to follow by
the old saying, "Don't bite the hand that feeds you."
As for the cases mentioned in Sections II and III of
this thesis, they all have at least one thing in common.
They were all situations in which the auditors were either
negligent and believed the misleading information that they
were given, or the auditors lost independence for one of
the reasons mentioned above. In several of the cases, it
was the establishment of relationships and the reliance on
26
audit fees that caused the auditors to overlook the fraud.
In the cases that the auditors were aware of the fraud but
chose to assist in the cover-up, the audit firm experienced
losses so severe that they were forced to close their doors
as well. Situations like these are the reasons why






The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was adopted in response
to the increasing number of fraud cases surfacing in the
United States in the last ten years. It was signed into
law only a month and a half following its conception,
mainly because of the urgent need for action. As mentioned
in the introduction, this Act consists of eleven titles and
a total of sixty-nine sections. The purpose of Sarbanes-
Oxley was to establish a set of standards and regulations
to which auditors and their clients would adhere. In this
section of the thesis, each title will be listed and
followed by a brief explanation of its contents. This will
familiarize the reader with the different titles of the Act
so that they can better understand why certain sections of
Sarbanes-Oxley need to be changed.
28
Title I- Effective Date- This title simply states that the
Act was signed into law by President Bush on July 30, 2002.
It also mentions that the SEC will establish rules that
will require certification requirements for CEO' s and CFO'
s
by August 29 of 2002. In addition, the SEC is required to
establish rules concerning the disclosure of off-balance
sheet transactions by January 26 of 2003
(
www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) .pdf )
.
Title II- Background- This title provides the reasons that
this Act was adopted. It mentions the Enron case along
with the collapse of Arthur Andersen and several other
large U.S. corporations. It discusses the fact that
independence and fraud played a major role in the downfall
of these corporations. Also, this section addresses the
urgency surrounding the Act and why it is to be implemented
immediately
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) .pdf )
Title III- Overview and Covered Entities- This title
includes an explanation of all of the entities that are to
adhere to the standards of Sarbanes-Oxley . This Act
applies to both U.S. publicly traded companies as well as
29
foreign companies traded on either NASDAQ or NYSE.
Investment companies must also follow the standards set
forth in Sarbanes-Oxley, and any company with publicly
traded debt securities is to abide by the rules and
restrictions of the Act as well. There is no mention of
companies that file reports with the SEC solely because of
covenant provisions in their indentures; however,
commentators believe that these companies will also be






Title IV- Corporate Governance Standards for Directors and
Executive Officers- This title sets the new certification
requirements for the CEO and CFO of a corporation.
According to Title IV, a CEO or CFO must now submit a
written certification that each quarterly or annual report
with attached financial statements issued by the company
has been reviewed and that the following conditions have
been met
:
1. The report complies with applicable reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act.
2. All information in the report represents fairly, in
all material respects, the true financial condition of
the company and its operating results.
30

3. The CEO/CFO have established internal controls that
will ensure that the material information in the
report has been made known to them, and that they have
included in the report their evaluation of the
effectiveness of the internal controls.
4 . They have disclosed to the company' s independent
auditors and audit committee all deficiencies in the
design and implementation of the controls as well as
any fraud that involves management.
5. They have reported whether or not there have been any
significant changes in internal controls during that
particular reporting period
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) . pdf )
.
Title V- Public Company Accounting Oversight Board- The
purpose of this section of Sarbanes-Oxley is to establish
an SEC-supervised non-governmental Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. This board is responsible for
registering all public accounting firms that practice
before the SEC as well as establishing quality controls and
independence standards. This Board will have the authority
to conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings and
impose sanctions where justified. Among the quality
controls established in this section are requirements for
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the maintenance of audit papers for seven years instead of
five, second partner review of audit reports, and an
evaluation of the internal control structures of the
issuer. This Board has the power to suspend firms or
individuals within the firm from practice
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) .pdf )
.
Title VI- Auditor Independence Standards- This particular
section focuses on the independence problem that has
recently become such a vital issue in the accounting
profession. This portion of the Act specifically prohibits
public accounting firms that are registered with the SEC
from providing audit clients with non-audit services
including
:
1. Bookkeeping or other services related to the
accounting records
2. Financial information systems design and
implementation
3. Appraisal or valuation services
4 . Actuarial services
5. Internal audit outsourcing
6. Management functions or human resources services
7. Broker-dealer investment advisor or investment banking
services
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8. Legal services and expert services unrelated to the
audit
9. Any other services that the Board deems to be
impermissible
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) .pdf )
.
Notice that there is no mention of consulting services or
tax services. These issues are to be left up to the
auditing firm as to whether or not they could affect
independence. This section also mandates a rotation of
auditing firms so that the same firm can not audit one
company indefinitely.
Title VII- New Standards for Corporate Responsibility- This
portion of the Act can be difficult to understand, but
basically, it sets new rules that will prohibit the upper-
level executives from cashing in on their benefits before
the company goes under because of uncovered fraud. For
example, if a company has to make a financial restatement,
then the CEO and CFO must reimburse the company for any
incentive-based or equity-based compensation received since
the reporting of the erroneous financials. In addition, in
the case of a restatement, these executives must also
reimburse the company for any profits realized on the sale
of company securities within a twelve-month period. Also,
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this section sets new independence standards for audit
committees. No longer can any member of the audit
committee or Board of Directors (if a company has no audit
committee) accept any consulting or advisory fee, nor can
they be an "affiliated person" of the company being
audited. In Laymen's terms, this means that the members of
the audit committees can in no way be associated with the
operations of the company
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) . pdf )
.
Title VIII- Enhanced Financial Disclosures- Other than the
obvious full disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions,
this section of the Act also covers the disclosure of a
Code of Ethics that each company has established for its
senior financial officers as well as the disclosure of the
fact that each audit committee consists of at least one
"financial expert." In addition, the Act mandates
increased scrutiny on the following issuers:
1. those who have materially misstated their financial
statements
2. those who have experienced significant fluctuation in
their stock price as compared to others in the
industry
3. those with a large market capitalization
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4. emerging companies with inconsistencies in their price
to earnings ratio
5. those whose operations significantly affect a material
sector of the economy (i.e. Microsoft)







Title IX- Analyst Conflicts of Interest- This section of
Sarbanes-Oxley focuses on the disclosure of any conflicts
of interest that may arise when securities analysts
recommend equity securities in research reports and
public appearances. Also, this title prohibits the
practice of publishing research reports on companies in
proximity to public offerings of their securities. In
other words, no one can let information pertaining to the
operations of a company leak before the company wants the
public to know
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) .pdf )
.
Title X- Studies and Reports Ordered- This section
basically provides a foundation for the Comptroller
General to research and report the reasons for both the
collapse of major accounting firms and corporations in
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the U.S. as well as the degree to which federal
regulations impede competition among public accounting
firms. Also, the study will include an investigation
into the types of transactions that allow companies to
manipulate earnings and how to keep these transactions
from becoming a part of everyday operations
( www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY Apr03(Bost) .pdf )
.
Title XI- Penalties and Increased Enforcement- This
section sets the punishments for CEO' s and CFO' s who are
convicted of certifying non-complying or misstated
financials. A CEO or CFO can be fined up to $1 million
and/or imprisoned for up to ten years if he or she allows
the release of faulty financial statements. If the
CEO/CFO knows about the misstatements and then certifies
the financials, then the punishment can increase to $5
million and up to twenty years in prison. If an auditor
is accused of destroying audit papers, he or she can also
draw a fine and anywhere from five to twenty years in
prison. This section also includes a statutory
protection against employers taking action against
whistleblowers who follow the provisions of this Act. It
also states that there will be increased penalties for
both mail fraud and wire fraud, raising the sentence from
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*Please note that all claims made in this section of the thesis are solely my
opinion and should in no way be taken as fact.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was created for the
purpose of establishing standards by which audit firms and
corporations would abide. It not only creates standards
for these companies, but it also separates responsibilities
and determines punishments for those who fail to adhere to
the provisions set forth in the Act. In the fifteen or
sixteen days worth of reading Sarbanes-Oxley over and over,
several instances surfaced where an important fact was
either disregarded or overlooked. Perhaps it was that the
Act was thrown together too quickly for the sake of urgency
or perhaps it was merely a lack of attention by those
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responsible for adopting it, but whatever the case,
Sarbanes-Oxley is by no means perfect. For the most part,
this Act will serve its purpose; however, the research
revealed a few areas in which Congress should make changes.
These problems are in the following titles to the Act:
Title IV- Corporate Governance Standards for Directors and
Executive Officers- This section of the Act clearly
establishes the CEO/CFO as the responsible party for any
fraudulent activity. The CEO/CFO must review the financial
statements and certify that all of the information is
correct and without material misstatement. The only
problem with this requirement is that there exists a
possibility that the CEO/CFO may not be fully aware of the
transactions in every account that exists, especially in a
large corporation. For example, it is possible that a
person in the Accounts Payable department may be creating
false invoices and stealing money from the company.
Although this action could have a significant impact on the
financial condition of the company, the CEO or CFO may have
no clue that this is taking place, especially if this
fraudulent activity is committed by a manager. In any
large company, there must exists at least a certain level
of trust between the CEO and his or her upper-level
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managers. A CEO must be able to believe a manager when he
or she provides financial information. In addition, the
CEO/CFO is responsible for reporting any fraudulent
activity at the management levels. If there exists fraud
within a corporation and the CEO/CFO does not report it,
then he or she will be the responsible party. Again, it is
possible that the CEO/CFO is unaware of what is going on.
Although this is not always the case, it is likely that a
CEO/CFO would report any fraudulent activity that he or she
knows about, especially if he or she is not involved. One
CEO of a large corporation here in Columbus said that he is
a bit worried about Title IV because he feels it is unfair
to hold the CEO/CFO responsible for something of which he
or she is completely unaware. He also feels that it is
unfair to hold the CEO/CFO responsible for fraud with which
he or she is not involved.
Title V- Public Company Accounting Oversight Board- Title V
establishes the creation of a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. This Board is responsible for
establishing quality controls and independence standards as
well as conducting investigations into any reported
fraudulent activity. One control established by the Board
enforces a second partner review of audited financial
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statements. Although there are no concerns with the
establishment of this Board, there are a few problems with
the assignment of its duties. First, this Board has the
authority to conduct investigation if fraud has been
suspected. The problem with this is that by the time fraud
has been detected, it could have been taking place for
years. Sometimes, the detection of fraudulent activity
could prove to be too late. This Board could potentially
be implemented in such a way that it stops most fraud
before it begins. A further explanation exists in Section
VII of the thesis. Also, there is a problem with the
standard that requires a second partner review of audited
financial statements. Often times, it is not just one
partner that will let a material misstatement go unnoticed.
Because it is the entire firm that relies on the audit
fees, a second partner review would more than likely prove
to be unhelpful to the situation
( http : //www .riscpa.org/files/winter2003. pdf )
.
Title VI- Auditor Independence Standards- The only problem
with this particular title of the Act is that it fails to
mention consulting services or tax services in its
restrictions for an auditing firm. The reason that these
services are not mentioned is because most of a CPA firm'
s
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income comes from consulting services, tax services, and
auditing services. Congress knew that if an audit firm
were not allowed to provide these services to its clients,
then the Act would have caused an uproar from these large
accounting firms. The services restricted by Title VI of
the Act provide, on average, less than five percent of an
accounting firm's yearly income. Although these accounting
firms should be allowed to provide consulting or tax
services, there is a better solution to the problem other
than simply avoiding the issue.
Title VII- New Standards for Corporate Responsibility- This
title of the Act comes as a direct result of the Enron
case. Upon issuing the restatement of Enron's financials,
the upper-level executives predicted the downfall of the
company and began cashing in on their 401 (k) plans, etc.
The employees of the company had no idea about what was
about to happen, and many of them faced terrible losses at
the hands Of the executives ( http://vvww.thylctueid.com/ai-ticles/article/ait 138 iclx.htin ) .
In Title VII, the CEO's and CFO's of any company that
declares a restatement must repay any incentive-based or
equity-based compensation that he or she received beyond
the release date of the erroneous financials. Also, these
executives must reimburse the company for any profit
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realized on the sale of company based securities in the
twelve-month period following the release of the faulty
financial statements. The problem with this again lies in
the fact that a CEO or CFO may not know about the
fraudulent activity or the material misstatement.
According to Sarbanes-Oxley, if this situation occurs, then
the CEO/CFO will be punished double. The first punishment
will be for certifying the material misstatement in the
first place, and the second punishment will be the
repayment of any profits or compensation if the
misstatement is discovered. What if the CEO or CFO does
not know about the misstatement and certifies the
financials? Then, at a later date, the CEO or CFO detects
the fraud and is the one who discovers what has been going
on in the company. Do the punishments and responsibilities
set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley for a CEO or CFO provide
incentive for the CEO/CFO to report the fraudulent
activity? No, instead these provisions provide greater
incentive for these executives to try to cover up the
misstatements, even if they knew nothing about them in the
first place ( http://www.thelenreid.com/articles/article/art 138 idx.htm ) .
Title XI- Penalties and Increased Enforcement- One can
provide the same argument against this title of the Act
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that exists with the others. Where is the justification in
punishing the CEO or CFO when he or she potentially had
nothing to do with the fraudulent activity? First, an
investigation should take place, and the punishments should
be given out based on each person' s involvement in the
fraud or cover-up. If the judicial system is unable to
find where a person was involved, then there is no
justification in punishing that person. The judicial
standard in the United States is "innocent until proven
guilty." So why does this basis change for corporate
America? In the case of Title XI, the CEO or CFO is
punished based simply on the fact that the faulty
financials were released in the first place. Also, this
title sets forth the punishments for the auditing firm that
audited the company. These punishments for the auditors
appear to be less strict than the punishments for the CEO
or CFO. If any member of an auditing firm is aware of the
fraud and assists in the cover-up, then he or she should
receive a much harsher punishments than the executives of
the company ( http: //www, thelenreid.com/articles/article/art 138 idx.htm ) .
After all, is it not the job of the auditors to detect the
fraud and report it to the public? As humans, we should
expect that a corporation would try to get an edge by
overstating financials or providing misleading information.
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This is the reason that audit firms were established in the
first place. However, an auditor should never be
influenced to the point that he or she does not serve his
or her duty to the public. This is a much worse crime that





*Please note that all claims made in this section of the thesis are solely my opinion and
should in no way be taken as fact.
Section VI of the thesis pointed out several problems
with the different titles in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. For each one of the problems listed in Section VI,
Section VII proposes a solution that provides a much more
effective alternative. These solutions provide better
methods of assigning responsibilities and duties, and they
also focus on the utilization of the Board in such a way
that it prevents a lot of fraudulent activity. The




Title IV- Corporate Governance Standards for Directors and
Executive Officers- As mentioned previously, this section
focuses on the new certification requirements for a CEO/CFO
and their responsibilities for financial misstatements.
The most logical explanation for this problem is to
investigate the fraudulent activity or misstatements before
assigning responsibility. Because the possibility exists
that the CEO/CFO may be unaware of the fraudulent activity
or financial misstatements, then investigative procedures
performed by the newly established Board should provide the
basis for determining punishment. If the Board
investigates a financial misstatement only to find that the
CEO/CFO had been given misleading information, then the
fair thing to do is punish the managers or executives
responsible for providing the misleading figures. However,
if the Board finds that the CEO/CFO was fully aware of the
fraudulent activity, then he or she should be punished to
the fullest extent of Title XI.
Title V- Public Company Accounting Oversight Board- The two
changes/additions that need to be made to Title V involve
the duties and responsibilities of the Board. First, this
Board could potentially be a system of fraud prevention in
addition to its investigative duties. Along with allowing
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the Board to conduct investigations upon the surfacing of
fraudulent activity, they should also be given the
authority to conduct random investigations into any
corporation at any time. If a company knows that their
activity has become suspect, then they will have time to
cover up a lot of the evidence leading to the persons
behind the misleading activity. However, the allowance of
random investigations could provide the fear factor that
stops a lot of fraud before it begins. If a company knows
that it could be investigated at any given time, then it
might be less likely to try to get away with "cooking the
books." In comparison, restaurants know that they could be
inspected and shut down at any given time, so for the most
part, they keep their places of business clean. However,
if restaurants were only inspected when someone complained,
then there would be more unsanitary eating establishments
all over the U.S. Also, one of the provisions that the
Board has established needs to be changed. Instead of
requiring a second partner review of audited financial
statements, the Board could require that these audit firms
submit to them a copy of the work papers used during the
audit of suspect companies. In this, the Board could
ensure that there is no fraud taking place and that the
auditors are doing their job. Because this Board has no
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reliance on the hefty audit fees, then they have no reason
to let anything slip through the cracks.
Title VI- Auditor Independence Standards- The solution to
the problem mentioned in Section VI concerning auditor
independence standards is to require that audit firms keep
all service providing divisions of the company separate.
By doing this, audit firms will only be allowed to report
their findings to the tax professionals and consulting
professionals in the company. They will not be allowed to
take part in performing the actual consulting service.
Although Title VII of the Act states that no person on the
audit committee will be allowed to receive consulting fees,
it does not specify the separation of the divisions within
a public accounting firm. What this means is that the
persons on the audit committee can still provide consulting
services and simply charge the consulting as increased
audit fees. By separating the divisions, the company will
be forced to show the revenues as separate, which will
ensure that the services are being provided by two
different groups of people. Although this method will not
provide the assurance of complete independence, it is
definitely a step in the right direction. The fail-safe
method for complete independence is to not allow auditing
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firms to perform consulting services at all, but as
mentioned in Section VI, this would definitely cause
problems for the major accounting firms. So for now, this
approach seems to be the alternative that keeps everyone
satisfied
.
Title VII- New Standards for Corporate Responsibility- The
solution to the problem with Title VII is similar to the
solution to the problem for Title IV. Before an upper-
level executive should be punished for fraudulent activity
within a corporation, the Board should conduct an
investigation to make sure that the CEO/CFO knew of what
was occurring within the company. If he or she knew
nothing about the crooked activity taking place, then it is
unfair to force him or her to repay any incentive-based or
equity-based compensation along with any profits from the
sale of company securities. Instead, these executives
should only be forced to repay this compensation if it can
be proven that he or she was aware of the dubious activity.
This procedure will allow the CEO or CFO the freedom to
report the suspicious activity with the comfort of knowing
that they will not be punished because they had no idea
that it was taking place. If the Act remains the way it
was written originally, then investigations will prove that
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more CEO' s and CFO' s are getting involved in cover-up
attempts instead of taking the proper actions to alleviate
the problems
.
Title XI- Penalties and Increased Enforcement- Much like
the other problems with the other titles in Sarbanes-Oxley
,
this one also requires attention in the area of assigning
responsibility. CEO's and CFO' s should only be punished
after an investigation proves guilt instead of punishing
them based on the assumption that they were involved in the
deceitful activity. In addition, negligent auditors as
well as those involved in the cover-up of a major fraud
scheme should be punished to a much greater degree than the
executives of the company. As mentioned previously, human
nature gives us the desire to get ahead, and some people
will do anything to reach the top. It is for this reason
that fraud exists, and fraud is why we need auditors. The
public relies on auditors to report any material
misstatements in a company's financials, so to whom can we
turn if auditors are no longer doing their job? Of all of
the cases mentioned in Sections II and III of this thesis,
the auditors could have prevented the fraudulent activity
had it been detected in the first year that it occurred.
However, auditor negligence or involvement at some level
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allowed the treacherous activity to get out of hand. Some
may argue that both sides are to blame for the terrible
losses experienced by the shareholders of these major
corporations, but it is mostly the fault of the auditing
firms. After all, for what reason do they exist if it is
not to detect material fraud and report it to the public?
Because of this, Congress should modify the punishments set
forth in Title XI and make those designated for the




To provide an estimate on the costs of financial
fraud, it can be compared to the high-priced concern facing
our nation today, The War on Terrorism. In total, the Bush
administration has approved over $100 billion of spending
to fight the terrorists, but this is mere pocket change
compared to the estimated $7.5 trillion that /Americans have
lost at the hands of greedy corporate executives
(Vernich 17) . Because of this, the United States
definitely needed action, and Sarbanes-Oxley was supposed
to be the answer to this ongoing problem. Sarbanes-Oxley
was surely going to provide the rules and regulations that
would stop corporate America from robbing its investors and
put U.S. businesses back on the right track. Although the
plan seems noble, it is a far-fetched goal considering the
problems within the body of the Act. Unless Sarbanes-Oxley
is changed, it could eventually prove to be harmful to the
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situation. In the past, corporate executives would merely
front their lies as restatements when they felt pressure to
prove their financial claims. These restatements would
provide the suspicion needed to conduct internal
investigations that almost always brought out the truth.
However, considering the questionable provisions in
Sarbanes-Oxley, it is possible that we may face the dilemma
of even more elaborate cover-up schemes by both corporate
executives and auditors alike. If Sarbanes-Oxley is
revised and the focus is shifted towards stopping fraud
before it starts and punishing those responsible for the
deceitful activity, then these greedy businessmen can
eventually be eradicated, and the public can learn to trust
corporate America once again. Until then, Sarbanes-Oxley
is not a solution. Instead, it is nothing more than just a




Before writing this thesis, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 was just another unfamiliar law. In fact, some of the
original suggestions for provisions were already a part of
Sarbanes-Oxley. After twenty-one straight days of writing
and researching this Act, all sixty-nine sections of rules
and regulations have become second nature. This knowledge
will prove useful because it is the type of knowledge and
hard work that one can carry into future projects. At
times, writing this thesis became very difficult, and
quitting was definitely a consideration. However,
finishing this type of project allows for the perseverance
and strong will that is required by corporate America.
Maybe if the greedy upper-level executives of today'
s
society had faced and overcome such tasks, then they would
not always be looking for the easy way out.
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